

**IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES**

In re Application of	:	Customer Number: 46320
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Matthias BIERBRAUER, et al.	:	Confirmation Number: 7481
	:	
Application No.: 10/020,048	:	Group Art Unit: 2178
	:	
Filed: December 14, 2001	:	Examiner: M. Ludwig
	:	
For: METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR MOVING SINGLE DOCUMENTS BETWEEN A DOCUMENT PROCESSING SYSTEM AND A DOCUMENT REPOSITORY		

REPLY BRIEF

Mail Stop Appeal Brief - Patents
Commissioner For Patents
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, VA 22313-1450

Sir:

This Reply Brief is submitted under 37 C.F.R. § 41.41 in response to the EXAMINER'S ANSWER dated February 5, 2008.

The Examiner's response to Appellants' arguments submitted in the Appeal Brief of November 26, 2007, raises additional issues and underscores the factual and legal shortcomings in the Examiner's rejection. In response, Appellants rely upon the arguments presented in the Appeal Brief of November 26, 2007, and the arguments set forth below.

REMARKS

At the outset, before addressing the Examiner's response to Appellants' arguments presented in the Appeal Brief, Appellants note that the Examiner has submitted a non-compliant Examiner's Answer. As is evident from the extensive comments presented by Appellants during prosecution of the present Application and in the Appeal Brief, there are questions as to how the limitations in the claims correspond to features in the applied prior art. In this regard, reference is made to M.P.E.P. § 1207.02, entitled "Contents of Examiner's Answer." Specifically, the following is stated:

(A) CONTENT REQUIREMENTS FOR EXAMINER'S ANSWER. The examiner's answer is required to include, under appropriate headings, in the order indicated, the following items:

...

(9)(c) For each rejection under 35 U.S.C. 102 or 103 where there are questions as to how limitations in the claims correspond to features in the prior art even after the examiner complies with the requirements of paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section, the examiner must compare at least one of the rejected claims feature by feature with the prior art relied on in the rejection. The comparison must align the language of the claim side-by-side with a reference to the specific page, line number, drawing reference number, and quotation from the prior art, as appropriate. (emphasis added)

However, upon reviewing the Examiner's Answer, Appellants note a lack of a section within the Examiner's Answer that meets the requirements described in the aforementioned section. Thus, the Examiner's Answer is non-compliant and further evidences the Examiner's continued failure to clearly identify the features within the prior art being relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims and continued failure to clearly explain the pertinence of the applied prior art, as required by 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(c).

Appellants have compared the statement of the rejection found on pages 3-6 of the Examiner's Answer with the statement of the rejection found on pages 2-5 of the Sixth Office

Action. Upon making this comparison, Appellants have been unable to discover any substantial differences between the respective statements of the rejection. As such, Appellants proceed on the basis that the Examiner's sole response to Appellants' Appeal Brief is found on pages 10-17 of the Examiner's Answer.

As already alluded to above, on pages 3 and 4 of the Appeal Brief, Appellants presented arguments that the Examiner has failed to fully establish the underlying facts regarding the scope and content of the prior art and the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art. Upon reviewing the Examiner's "Response to Argument" section on pages 6-8 of the Examiner's Answer, the Examiner did not address these arguments.

As a general matter, Appellants respectfully submit that the Examiner's strategy in rejecting the claims has not been to establish that the applied prior art teaches or makes obvious all of the claimed limitations. Instead, the Examiner's analysis is based upon ignoring the plain and ordinary meaning of certain claimed terms and construing these terms in an unreasonable manner so as to assert that the applied prior art teaches these limitations. The following statement is found on page 7 of the Examiner's Answer and is exemplary of the Examiner's analysis:

The broad nature of the interpretation by the Examiner lends itself to the broad nature of the claim language. The Examiner believes the limitations of the claim are replete with language that, when read broadly, could be interpreted multiple ways by the reference to Hoffert reference.

In each instance that the Examiner asserts that the claims terms could be "read broadly" and "interpreted multiple ways" the Examiner fails to provide any supporting explanation. Not only does the Examiner not give examples as to how the claim language could be interpreted multiple ways, but more importantly, the Examiner fails to provide any substantial evidence for the

Examiner's proposed interpretation. Instead, the Examiner's analysis are conclusory statements that lack factual support. Thus, the Examiner is improperly acting as a lexicographer in defining the language of the claims so as to aid the Examiner in rejecting the claims.

On pages 4-6 of the Appeal Brief, Appellants presented arguments with regard to the claimed "obtaining structural information describing the structural elements of a sequential file of documents in which the single document is located." Initially, the Examiner asserted the following on page 6 of the Examiner's Answer:

The appellant on page 5 of the appeal brief states the Examiner has failed to properly identify, using the reference to Hoffert, the 'structural information' describing structural elements of a sequential file of documents. The Examiner believes a description of 'structural information' and 'structural elements' in relation to a sequential file of documents could be found in the Hoffert reference when the reference discusses the retrieval of HTML documents and the parsing of specific HTML documents for media content. HTML itself is made up of structured information based upon the markup language contained within the document and the structural elements would be the tags found within the structured information. The reference provides a description of 'structural information' and 'structural elements' within columns 3 and 4 of the reference. (emphasis added)

The underlined portion of the above-reproduced passage is an example of a factually unsupported and improper claim construction. As claimed, the "structural information [describe] the structural elements of a sequential file of documents." To teach this structural information, the Examiner is relying upon the assertion that HTML is made up of structured information.

The Examiner errs by equating information that is ordered in a structure (i.e., structured information) with information about a structure (i.e., structural information). These types of limitations, however, are entirely different. Structured data describes a characteristic/format of the data itself (i.e., the data has a specific format). On the contrary, structural data is data that describes the structure/format of something else (i.e., structural elements of a sequential file of

documents). Thus, the Examiner has improperly asserted that Hoffert teaches the structural information, as claimed.

Moreover, as noted by Appellants on pages 5 and 6 of the Appeal Brief, the limitation at issue can be split into two portions: (i) structural information is obtained that describes structural elements of a file and (ii) the file is a sequential file of documents in which "the single document" is located. Even *assuming arguendo* that the Examiner's analysis is correct, as claimed, the structural information describes structural elements of a file of documents. Thus, the structural elements describe a file (of documents). The structured information of a particular HTML document describes how the data in the document is to be formatted. Thus, the teaching, within Hoffert, of information used to format data within a document does not identically disclose the claimed information about structural elements of a file (of documents). Therefore, the Examiner has improperly characterized the underlying facts regarding the scope and content of the prior art and the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art.

In the first full paragraph on page 6 of the Appeal Brief, Appellants presented arguments regarding the Examiner obviousness analysis as to the claimed "sequential file of documents." In response to these arguments, the Examiner asserted the following on pages 6 and 7 of the Examiner's Answer:

Furthermore, the phrase 'sequential file of documents' is suggested by the reference to Hoffert when it describes the process of the crawler retrieving media content web pages that are stored within a database. The reference mentions that the crawler begins with a seed of multimedia specific URL sites for its search. See column 3, lines 29-35. The sequential file of documents, as presently claimed, is suggested based upon the utilization of a database and the sequential nature of storing documents. If the system looks specifically for media file types within a database then it suggests a sequential file of documents being selected by a repository which one piece of content at a time to be analyzed by the crawler. The Examiner interpreted the phrase 'sequential file of

documents' broadly because the there is not language defining what is meant by a sequential file of documents. (emphasis added)

The Examiner's obviousness analysis is based upon a factually-unsupported inherency argument. Specifically, the Examiner is relying upon "the sequential nature of storing documents." The Examiner, however, has failed to factually establish that documents are inherently (i.e., necessarily) stored sequentially in a database. Instead, as would be recognized by anybody who has run a defragging program on a hard drive, files are not necessarily stored sequentially in a database. Instead, files are stored where space exists in the database. As documents are deleted/modified, the available space within a database continually changes. Thus, not only are documents not necessarily stored sequentially, a single document may be stored in different locations.¹ Therefore, the Examiner's obviousness analysis is predicated upon an improper inherency analysis.

The Examiner's assumption that "[i]f the system looks specifically for media file types within a database then it suggests a sequential file of documents being selected by a repository which one piece of content at a time to be analyzed by the crawler" is entirely factually unsupported. Although certain of Appellants' claims are directed to sequentially stored documents, the Examiner cannot properly assert that this is inherent within the teachings of the applied prior art since, as already established, documents are not necessarily stored sequentially within the prior art.

Appellants also note that the Examiner's assertion that "[t]he Examiner interpreted the phrase 'sequential file of documents' broadly because the there is not language defining what is

¹ See discussion at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defragmentation>.

meant by a sequential file of documents." The Examiner, however, did not explicitly set forth the Examiner's interpretation or specifically explain why the Examiner's interpretation is the broadest, reasonably interpretation consistent with Appellants' specification. As to the Examiner's assertion that the specification does not describe this term, reference is made to page 5, line 18 through page 6, line 1:

From a physical point of view 107, the documents 103-106 are stored sequentially within a database file 108 as sequential units 109-112, indicated by different patterns.

Therefore, a proper claim construction of the phrase "sequential file of documents" should reflect the notion that the documents are stored within a file, and the documents are sequentially stored within the file.

On page 6 of the Appeal Brief, Appellants argued that scanning for predetermined types of HTML tags (see column 4, lines 33-34), as taught by Hoffert, does not disclose the claimed "obtaining meta information describing the properties of the single document." In response to these arguments, the Examiner asserted the following in the first full paragraph on page 7 of the Examiner's Answer:

On page 6 of the appeal brief, appellant argues the limitation 'obtaining meta information describing the properties of the single document'. More specifically, appellant states a heading itself could be considered meta information however an HTML tag of a heading is not meta information describing properties of a document. The Examiner interprets 'meta information' as a type of information and believes the 'meta information' is suggested in the reference by the use of HTML tags and the tags being scanned for headings suggest properties of a document. See page 4, lines 31-45. The broad nature of the interpretation by the Examiner lends itself to the broad nature of the claim language. The Examiner believes the limitations of the claim are replete with language that, when read broadly, could be interpreted multiple ways by the reference to Hoffert reference.

In the underlined portion of the above-reproduced passage, the Examiner again presents a factually-unsupported and improper claim construction. By asserting that "meta information" is

"a type of information," the Examiner completely reads out of this claimed term the specific meanings associated with this term by one having ordinary skill in the art.²

The Examiner's claim interpretation is contrary to how the term is used within the context of the claim. Specifically, claim 1, in part, recites the following limitations:

obtaining meta information describing the properties of the single document;
obtaining document content of the single document.

However, what the Examiner asserts to be meta information (see page 4, lines 31-45 of Hoffert) is actually document content. Under the doctrine of claim differentiation, one having ordinary skill in the art would not equate meta information with document content. Thus, the Examiner has improperly characterized the underlying facts regarding the scope and content of the prior art and the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art.

On pages 7 and 8 of the Appeal Brief, Appellants several arguments with regard to the last two steps (i.e., "creating ..." and "transferring ...") recited in claim 1. In response to these arguments, the Examiner asserted the following in the paragraph spanning pages 7 and 8 of the Examiner's Answer:

On page 7 of the appeal brief, appellant states the physical representation of the single document is based upon the obtained structured information, meta information, and document content. The reference to Hoffert discloses a media URL found using the crawler contains specific media content which is then stored. A physical representation of the specific document stored is suggested by the media content itself which is scanned and located through the use of the crawler. The media content found through the scanning of HTML pages is based on the structural information, meta information, and document content (media content), as discussed in the above section of the Examiner's Answer. The appellant strongly disagrees with the Examiner's

² See discussion at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meta_information.

1 interpretation of a 'physical representation' for the single document. However, as presently
2 claimed, the language fails to preclude the Examiner from utilizing the reference to Hoffert to
3 provide media content URLs stored in a repository as a physical representation of a document. The
4 phrase 'physical representation' was objected to by the Examiner in the last office action mailed
5 8/24/07 because the Examiner thought the phrase left the claim open to multiple interpretations
6 when read broadly within the scope of the invention. Thus, the broad nature of the term when read
7 as whole within the independent claim is suggested by the Hoffert reference using media content
8 retrieved and stored by the crawler. (emphasis added)
9

10 As previously referred to, the Examiner yet again asserts that a claims is "open to multiple
11 interpretations when read broadly within the scope of the invention." However, the Examiner
12 fails to provide these multiple interpretations. Although not clearly stated, the Examiner appears
13 to be asserting that "[a] physical representation is suggested by the media content itself."

14
15 The inconsistency of this interpretation with the teachings of Hoffert is apparent when the
16 Examiner asserts "[t]he media content found through the scanning of HTML pages is based on
17 the structural information, meta information, and document content (media content)." Thus, the
18 Examiner is asserting that media content is found based upon on the structural information, meta
19 information, and document content. However, the claimed invention recites that the physical
20 representation is created. Notwithstanding this fatal flaw is the Examiner's analysis, even if the
21 Examiner intended to assert that the media content was created (i.e., corresponding to the
22 claimed "creating a physical representation for the single document based on the obtained
23 structural information, meta information and document content) using the media content, the
24 question raised by the Examiner's analysis would be comparable to "what comes first, the
25 chicken or the egg?" The Examiner is asserting that the media content is used to create the
26 media content, which begs the question as to how the media content (which is used to create the
27 media content) is created.
28

Notwithstanding the Examiner's factually-unsupported and internally-inconsistent claim construction, Appellants note that claim 1 recites "creating a physical representation for the single document based on the obtained structural information." As claimed, the "structural information" regards the structural elements of a sequential file of documents. Thus, the physical information of the single document not only includes meta information (about the single document) and document content (of the single document), the physical information of the single document includes information about data not specific to the single document itself (i.e., the structural elements of a sequential file of documents). This limitation is entirely absent from the teachings of Hoffert.

Regarding the claimed transferring step, Appellants presented arguments on page 8 that the passage cited by the Examiner neither refers to transferring, in general, nor transferring to a document repository. This argument, however, was not addressed by the Examiner in the Examiner's Answer.

On pages 8 and 9, Appellants presented arguments as to claims 5-9 and 13-17, which are directed to considerably different limitations than claims 1-4. As noted in Appellants' arguments, claims 5-9 and 13-17 are directed to "moving a folder and documents contained therein." Claims 1-4, however, are completely silent with regard to a folder. However, the Examiner did not offer a separate rejection to these claims. In response to these arguments, the Examiner asserted the following in the last full paragraph on page 8 of the Examiner's Answer:

Appellant states on page 8, regarding the rejections of claims 5-9 and 13-17, that the reference to Hoffert fails to provide any teaching or suggestion of a folder structure and documents. The arguments above detail the movement of documents between a document

processing system and a document repository. The reference provides a crawler which scans for a robot exclusion protocol file. If the file is present, it indicates those directories which should not be scanned for information. On a per directory basis, there is proposed to be stored a media description file. The file contains a series of records of textual information for each media file within the current directory. The structural information obtained through document scanning is similarly retrieved through the scanning of directories. The use of directories within the reference to Hoffert suggests a folder structure and a similar retrieval of media content through directories. The Examiner recognizes that obviousness can only be established' by combining or modifying the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed invention where there is some teaching, generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art. See *In re Fine*, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 USPQ2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988) and *In re Jones*, 958 F.2d 247, 21 USPQ2d 1941 (Fed. Cir. 1992). (emphasis added)

For ease of reference, the underlined portion of the above-reproduced passage is found in column 3, line 61 through column 4, line 4.

Initially, Appellants note that the Examiner has entirely mischaracterized the claims. Claims 5-9 and 13-17 are not simply reciting "a folder structure and documents." Instead, these claims are reciting a method and system for moving a folder and documents contained therein between a document processing system and a document repository. This concept is completely absent from the teachings of Hoffert.

The passage cited by the Examiner refers to a teaching of a robot exclusion file, which when read, prevents the web crawler from searching a particular directory. The relevance of these teachings to the claimed steps of obtaining structural information, obtaining meta information, creating a physical representation and transferring the created physical representation is entirely unclear to Appellants. The Examiner's analysis as to all of the claimed limitations is deficient. Therefore, the Examiner has yet again improperly characterized the underlying facts regarding the scope and content of the prior art and the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art.

For the reasons set forth in the Appeal Brief of November 26, 2007, and for those set forth herein, Appellants respectfully solicit the Honorable Board to reverse the Examiner's rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103.

To the extent necessary, a petition for an extension of time under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136 is hereby made. Please charge any shortage in fees due in connection with the filing of this paper, including extension of time fees, to Deposit Account 09-0461, and please credit any excess fees to such deposit account.

Date: April 7, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

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